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Summary
From 1997 to 2001 we observe in the Usa a faster growth in the number of
Nonemployer firms (NF) vis à vis Employer firms (EF). The diverse speed of net entry
may be due to particular internal organisation of the two types of firms and the effect
that this has on the reactions to market uncertainty. However, the set of internal
organizations of firms is larger than that made up simply by EFs and NFs, in particular
among newborn firms, since we observe corporate start-ups with employees, firms
owned and managed by their founders who are simultaneously the employees and,
finally, non corporate enterprises. The second class of firms mostly belongs to the
category of NFs, according to US nomenclature, while non corporate firms may belong
to either category. Our curiosity is attracted by different entry patterns of NFs and EFs
and our aim is to interpret them. According to recent literature, firms carry out an
irreversible investment, such as entry, only if market prices are strictly larger than
average total costs (Marshallian point). However, the trigger price that makes firms
become active is affected by institutional rules, the existence of profit sharing,
efficiency wages, exit options - i.e. partial reversibility -, financial constraints. Then, the
internal organization of a newborn firm may make the difference. In a continuous time
stochastic environment, where firms bear a sunk cost, we model entry as a growth
option. On the trace of distinct objective functions we show that NFs and EFs have
specific entry patterns in terms of output price and/or size. Why? Simply because they
react in diverse fashions to market price volatility. In this sense we are able to show
that, in most cases, the NF is locally less risky. This makes the NF better suited to enter
under conditions of higher volatility. This exactly corresponds to what happened during
the years between 1997-2001.
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E-mail: moretto@eco.unibs.it1I n t r o d u c t i o n
From 1997 to 2001 in the Usa we observe a faster growth in the number
of Nonemployer …rms (NF) vis à vis Employer …rms (EF). This diverse
speed of net entry may at …rst appear quite odd. However, to a closer
scrutiny it seems to be caused by distinct internal organizations that generate
di¤erent reactions to market uncertainty, quite high in those years of end of
millennium.
To validate this statement and better understand the phenomenon con-
sidered we have to go through the internal organization of …rms according to
the category they belong and their infant history.
Start-up …rms (SUFs) are the most dynamic part of the economy with
their active development of new goods and technological endeavors. Yet,
most of their operating modes are heterogeneous with respect to incumbent
consolidated …rms. Often their actions do not adhere to the traditional mar-
ket canons of Marshallian enterprise and their internal organization departs,
in many respects, from that of a purely pro…t-value maximizing …rm (PMF).
The inner structure and the governance of SUFs show a large variety of
organization modes. Most of them appear to be quite far from those pertain-
ing either to the publicly owned corporate,1 r u no nb e h a l fo fs h a r e h o l d e r s ,
or to the private corporate, whose control is in the hands of a family or an
individual owner. By limiting the variety of organizational forms, we may
distinguish at least two kinds of SUFs.
The …rst corresponds to newborn …rms made up of few people who are
simultaneously the owners and the employees of the venture they have cre-
1By the US de…nition of corporate we mean a …rm with limited liability of the owners.
According to UK nomenclature this …rm is either a public limited company (PLC) or a
private limited company (LTD).
3ated. This kind of …rm mostly belongs to the Nonemployer (NF)c a t e g o r y
comprising enterprises of three distinct legal and/or organizational forms: In-
dividual Proprietorship,2 Partnerships, Corporations,a l lw i t h o u te m p l o y e e s .
(according to the US Bureau of Census nomenclature; US Census Bureau,
2003a). The most common are the …rst two.3
The second kind of SUF belongs to the traditional Employer (EF)c a t -
egory, whose governance replicates that of a PMF, with separation between
employers and shareholders.
SUFs quickly grow or disappear. In the …rst case they often undergo
thorough transformation. Some become public or private corporate after an
initial period of noncorporate.4 Others are taken over by consolidated …rms.
Sometimes the transformation is more radical than what the pure change of
the legal status may hint. But before undergoing dimensional, …nancial, legal
2These …rms are close to the self-employed category of the European nomenclature.
See for instance Parker, Barmby and Belghitar (2004).
3H e r ef o l l o w st h eU SB u r e a uo fC e n s u sd e … n i t i o n : “ Individual proprietorship....is
an unincorporated business owned by an individual”. Self-employed persons are in-
cluded in this category. “Partnership .....is an unincorporated business owned by two
or more persons having a shared …nancial interest in the business”, i.e. sharing prof-
its and losses and responsabilities having a general or limited liability. “NF Corpo-
ration is a legally incorporated business under state laws”, without employees. See:
http://www.census.gov/epcd/nonemployer/view/de…ne.html
4See Steingold (1999). In addition see the advice of a large Bank like NatWest of
UK to SUFs as to the choice of their Legal status, with a particular emphasis on the






4and governance metamorphosis, turning a baby …rm into a mature corporate
enterprise, a SUF is a strange animal whose behavior may be at odds with
standard modelization of PMFs. Why? And in which sense?
The answer may come from the very existence of a large bulk of NFs
and in particular Partnerships. If we con…ne to the internal organization
of the newborn NFs, we may …nd that Partnerships closely replicate Labor
Managed …rms (LMF) and individual Proprietorship resemble LMFs, even
though in the limit due the single member structure. A similar proposi-
tion may be stated for NF Corporations.I nLMFs,5 owners and employees
coincide while sharing the governing power of the …rm on an equal foot. Sur-
prisingly enough, this is something that can be found in most NFs, whose
market behavior should then be expected to replicate fairly closely that of a
LMF. The question then boils down to what are the implications for entry
strategies of this odd similarity between NFs, one of the most dynamic form
of modern baby production, and LMFs, that most analysts regard as a sort
of bulky legacy of socialism.6
Here, we analyze entry strategies of …rms belonging either to the NFs
5See the canonical models of Ward (1958), Vanek (1970), the re…nements of Pestieau
and Thisse (1979), the empirical scrutiny of Pencavel and Craig (1994), the analysis of
LMF oligopolies in Delbono and Rossini (1992), workers’ enterprises in Sertel (1993), just
to mention few contributions.
6The theory of the LMF has evolved quite a lot in parallel with the growing success of
market economies vis à socialist economies. Literature has shown the long run a¢nities
between a competitive LMF and its corresponding PMF, despite heterogeneous behavior
in the short run. However, some of the problems concerning both the perverse response
of the short run supply and the di¢culty of LMFs t og e tc r e d i ta r ea s s u m e da w a yo n c e
we introduce tradeability of memberships - i.e.: workers’ enterprises (Sertel, 1982; 1997) -
or we assume that credit provided by members of the LMF is subordinate with respect to
the credit by banks or by any third agent (Jossa and Cuomo, 1997).
5or to the EFs. Our setting is a dynamic and uncertain one, where a new
venture is de…ned as a project that can be carried out at di¤erent points of
time and at di¤erent entry-trigger market prices.
Most di¤erences among the two kinds of …rms come from the existence
of uncertainty coupled to sunk costs. Thanks to the proximity between the
NF and the LMF we show that, in an uncertain dynamic environment, there
are circumstances where the NF enters at less favorable conditions becoming
the swiftest start-up, while in other circumstances the EF is smarter. More-
over, we analyze the entry strategies and the size of …rms and interpret the
recent growth of NFs in the US during a period of intense …nancial volatility.
Our aim is to see how market price volatility may favor one particular …rm
organization.
A by-product of this investigation is that the entry trigger price increases
in distinct fashions for the two kinds of …rms. A larger variance makes the
investment return more volatile. The value of the option grows but there is
a larger incentive to delay entry7.I nt h eNF each member shares this option
with colleagues. Therefore, he has to bear only a fraction of the entry cost.
If so, the outcome is a higher value of the option without any increase in the
incentive to delay entry.
In the next section some data about NFs and EFs are shown. In the third
section we present the basic set up. In section four we investigate di¤erent
entry policies. In the …fth some comparisons are carried out. In the …nal
section concluding remarks are drawn.
7This e¤ect follows form the "bad news principle of irreversible investment" (Bernanke,
1983).
62 Employer and Nonemployer businesses in
the US
When considering size we soon discover that many …rms are very small and
often made up just by the proprietor (Individual Proprietorship)o rb yf e w
guys who own the …rm in a Partnership mode. US Census data say that the
number of these …rms belonging to the NF category is rather high. Look
at Table 1. The establishments (est) of NFs are more than twice those of
EFs. Between the Censuses of 1997 and 2001 the number of NFs grew by
10%, while EFs just by 3%. If establishments are a proxy of the number of
…rms and NFs do not live, on average, longer than EFs8, we may conclude
that, during the period 1997-2001, the entry of NFs is more likely and easier
than that of EFs. Nonetheless, the weight of NFs in terms of the share of
income produced is lower, as we can see by comparing the receipts (re)o f
NFs and the payrolls (pa)o fEFs9. T h i sp r o v e st h a tu s u a l l yt h eNFs are
much smaller than the corresponding EFs.
8See Parker (2004) and Taylor (1999).
9Of course these two magnitudes are quite heterogeneous, yet we compare them just
qualitatively, without any measuring purpose.
7TABLE 1




1997 est 15,438,609 w: 10% est 6,894,869 w:3 %
1998 15,708,727 1.7% 6,941,822 0.7%
1999 16,152,604 2.8% 7,008,444 0.9%
2000 16,529,955 2.3% 7,070,048 0.9%
2001 16,979,49812 2.7% 7,095,302 0.3%
1997 re 586,315,757 w: 24% pa 3,047,907,469 w: 30%
1998 643,720,460 9.7% 3,309,405,533 7.4%
1999 667,219,733 3.7% 3,554,692,909 9.1%
2000 709,378,836 6.3% 3,879,430,052 9.1%
2001 729,922,06313 2.8% 3,989,086,323 2.8%
From Table 1 we calculate in 2001 the average receipts (re)f o rt h eNF
that was 43,000 dollars while the average payroll (pa)f o rt h eEF was 442,000
dollars. The two magnitudes (receipts and payrolls) provide proxy measures
of relative size of the two categories of …rms. As for the percentage varia-
tion (¢) o v e rt h ee n t i r ep e r i o d( w), for NFs is larger when considering the
number of establishments (10% versus 3%), rather than receipts and payrolls
10Payrolls (pa) and receipts (re) are in thousands dollars.
11w means percentage variation on the whole period 2001/1997. For NFs we have only
receipts. For EFs we have payrolls in thousands of current dollars.
122002 …gure is 17,646,062. and variation (w) over the period 1997-02 is 14.3%.
132002 …gure is 770,032,328 and variation over the period (w) 1997-02 is 31.3%.
8(24% versus 30%). Over the same period the number of establishments of
Partnerships increased by 26%, the largest rate of growth among all cate-
gories. The average size of establishment in 2001 is 123,000 dollars, larger
than the average of NFs, but still lower than EFs. Receipts of Partnerships
increased over the same time span by 39%.
3 The basic set up
Here is the basic framework drawing the borders of the environment where
we wish to compare the behavior of two SUFs:aNF and an EF.
We assume that:
1) Firms undertake a project of …nite size, corresponding to the start-up
decision. We consider a …rm in isolation, even though there are scanty
di¤erences with respect to a competitive market (Leahy, 1993).
2) The investment is irreversibly sunk. It can neither be changed, nor tem-
porarily stopped, nor shut down. Other operating options are neglected
for the sake of simplicity of comparisons14. The commitment is equal
to K.
3) When the …rm is operative the instantaneous short run revenue is
R(pt;Lt) ´ ptQ(Lt) (1)
14This avoids the analysis of operating options which di¤er between the two kinds of
…rms. The most relevant one is due to the ability of the …rm to reduce output or even
shut down, thereby eschewing variable costs. Operating options increase the value of the
…rm. See, among others, MacDonald and Siegel (1986) and, for a thorough discussion,
Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chs. 6 and 7).
9where pt is the market output price, Lt is labor input, Q(Lt) is the
short run Marshallian production function, with Q(0) = 0;Q 0(Lt) >
0;Q 00(Lt) < 0:
4) The market price is uncertain and evolves over time according to the
following trendless stochastic di¤erential equation:
dpt = ¾ptdBt with ¾>0 and p0 = p; (2)
where dBt is the increment of a standard Wiener process and the volatil-
ity parameter (¾)i sc o n s t a n to v e rt i m e .
5) The market wage for unit of labor w is constant.
6) The investment is …nanced either by founding employee-members, in the
case of the NF;15, or by shareholders, in the case of the EF.
3.1 The Nonemployer Firm (NF)
We investigate the NF decision to start-up a new venture and assume that:
(i) the number of employees-members is held …xed after entry16;( ii)e a c h
member investing in the project maximizes the discounted value of expected
individual net dividends; (iii) each member receives the sum of the account-
ing dividends plus the contractual wage w.
We solve this problem backwards. First, for any size of the NF (level of
L)w ee v a l u a t et h em e m b e ro p t i o nv a l u et oe n t e r .S u b s e q u e n t l y ,w ec h o o s e
L that maximizes the individual option value.
15This is consistent with the assumption of the existence of a market for NF member-
ships, operating according to standard …nancial canons (Sertel, 1993, 1997).
16In this sense the NF faces a kind of constraint since it cannot change L and it must
decide the optimal entry time.
10To evaluate the individual option we calculate the discounted value of




















where E0(:) is the expectation operator, with the information available at
time zero, ½ the riskless interest rate,17 and w
½ the discounted ‡ow of the
market wage, which corresponds to the minimum the NF grants its employee-
members, i.e., a participation constraint.
The employee-member belonging to a NF of size L decides whether and
when to start the project by solving an optimal stopping time problem, i.e.









¡½T j p0 = p
#
(4)
Members of the NF are homogeneous. Each one holds an option to invest
corresponding to (4) and has an interest to exercise cooperatively its option
a tt h es a m et i m e . 18 The option value comes from solving (4). The value of
















for p<p NF(L) (5)
17Introducing risk aversion does not change the results since the analysis can be devel-
oped under a risk neutral probability measure (Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps,
1979).
18Members have just founded the …rm of the optimal size and they have no incentive to
behave noncooperatively from the beginning.
11where 1 <¯<1 is the positive root of the auxiliary quadratic equation
ª(¯)=1
2¾2¯(¯¡1)¡½ =0and pNF is the critical price that makes the Lth
employee-member indi¤erent between investing right away or waiting. Max-
imizing (5) with respect to pNF we obtain the candidate policy for optimal
NF start-up as:
Lemma 1 The employee-member’s optimal strategy requires investing as soon











Q(L) is long-run average total cost.
Substituting (6) into (5) and rearranging we write, in reduced form, the
Lth employee-member’s value of the project prior to invest:
fNF(p;L)=A(L)p
¯ for p<p NF(L); (7)









½L + K]¯¡1 > 0
What is the optimal NF dimension? By (7) the optimum requires choos-
ing the L for which A(L) is the largest. Moreover, by (8), the optimum
dimension maximizes a(L); which yields the …rst order condition (FOC)19:
19Taking logs of a(L) we have ¯ logQ(L)¡(¯ ¡1)log(w




½ L + K) ¡ 1
¯ logL.










Since the r.h.s. of (9) is less than one, a necessary condition for an
optimal solution is an output elasticity "QL ´
LQ0(L)
Q(L) < 1; i.e. if the average
productivity
Q(L)
L is a decreasing function of labor (as from Assumption 3).
Although we cannot prove the second order condition (SOC) on a general
basis, we can provide examples of functions that are locally concave, such
as the following calibrated version of a(L); i.e.: Q =l o g ¸L: We mostly
follow suggestions from other studies (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) and calibrate
½ =0 :04;¾=0 :2;w =3 ;¸=2 :7; and K =1 0 : Figure 1 below shows a
local maximum, the interior solution, that occurs between L =1and 2 at
L =1 :07.








3.2 The Employer Firm (EF)
When does an EF enter the market? Entry is a project of in…nite life and
the …rm has to properly tune the input L over time. To ease comparisons
we make a simplifying hypothesis that parallels assumption (i)o nt h eNF:
labor is variable only ex-ante. The EF selects its project among a set of
ventures with the same K; but distinct levels of labor.20 The market value
















20This means a putty-clay technology.
14Whether and when to ignite the project is the solution of a standard












¡½T j p0 = p
#
(10)
Owing to the homogeneity of (3), we have:
FEF(p;L)=fNF(p;L)L (11)
where fNF(p;L) is the value of the project for the Lth member of the NF,
given by (4). By analogy with (5), and, as a result of the above arguments,
we obtain:
Lemma 3 The EF optimal strategy dictates investing as soon as the price








Then, substituting (12) into (11), the value of the option for an EF is:
FEF(p;L)=B(L)p
¯; for p<p EF(L) (13)









½L + K]¯¡1 > 0
Again, by (13), the optimum requires …nding the L for which B(L) is
the largest. Moreover, by (14), e¢cient size maximizes b(L) yielding the
following FOC:22
21This framework is similar to that of Dixit (1993), even though here we consider a
continuum of projects with total costs, w
½ L + K; which are linear in the labor input.
22Taking logs of b(L) we get ¯ logQ(L) ¡ (¯ ¡ 1)log(wL
½ + K); or













As for the NF, since the r.h.s. of (15) is less than one, a necessary condi-
tion is a production elasticity "QL < 1:23 Going through the same calibration
of the NF, we get a function B(L) depicted in Figure 2.
















¯1 < 1: This is equivalent to the condition proposed by Dixit (1993) for an EF …rm
that has to choose among alternative investment project of di¤erent dimension. See also
Moretto (2003) for an analogous condition for an EF …rm that can incrementally contract
its capacity.
16A maximum for L lies between 2 and 3. If we compare the two …rms, we
see that the optimal size of the EF is 2:99 (' 3)24 while for the NF is 1:06
(' 1).25
4 N Fv e r s u sE Fe n t r ys t r a t e g i e s
On the basis of Lemma 2 and 4, we are able to show that:
Proposition 1 a) Over the range where the second order condition holds,
the EF is operating with a higher dimension than the NF, i.e.:
LNF < ^ L<L EF;
where ^ L =a r gm i nAC(L) is the minimum e¢cient scale.26









The …rst part of the proposition con…rms the above numerical calculations
shown in Figure 1 and 2 and it is consistent with the empirical …nding that
NFs are smaller than corresponding EFs.27
24The number in brackets is the closest integer, since we do not use integer programming.
25The two triggers pNF(L) and pEF(L) are, respectively, 63:11 and 44:83.
26With the above calibration b L =1 :13:
27This is also consitent with literature on LMFs. ” Labor-managed …rms will be smaller
than their capitalist counterparts in the short-run when pro…t are positive” (Bonin and
Putterman, 1987, p.15). The same applies to the long run if pro…ts are strictly positive
(ibidem, p.57).
17To appreciate the intuition behind this result we go back to Lemmas 1- 4
and rewrite the FOCs for the optimal dimension (9) and (15) at entry. For




Then, the EF; at entry, decides the optimal dimension equating the value
marginal product to the market wage w: The EF is using L e¢ciently:








) >w : (17)
Unlike the EF,t h eNF chooses the optimal size equating the value mar-
ginal product to the full wage, which exceeds the market wage w: The Mar-
shallian full cost of the investment imputed to each employee-member is
w+½ K
LNF; larger than w since members of the NF possess an option (to de-
lay entry), not owned by employees of an EF. Would-be employee-members
are special workers endowed with an option to give rise to a kind of Partner-
ship and are therefore “more skillful” deserving a compensation larger than
w. By the decreasing marginal product of labor, at entry the NF will have
a smaller size than its twin mate EF,i . e .LNF <L EF:
The conclusion that the NF and the EF have di¤erent dimensions opens
the way to further questions about the entry price as size changes. However,
as the second part of Proposition 1 suggests, we cannot tell which one enters
…rst, even though the NF and the EF operate at di¤erent scales (NF to the
left of the minimum e¢cient scale ^ L; while EF to the right).
Both the NF and the EF undertake the entry investment when the
market price equals the average total cost AC(L) ´
wL
½ +K
Q(L) multiplied by a
18coe¢cient
¯
¯¡1½: Then, by the U-shaped AC(L) function we may observe, at
t h es a m em a r k e tp r i c e ,s m a l lNFs and larger EFs entering the market, as
data show in section 2.
4.1 A local study of the entry strategies
For more ‡eshy intuition on entry triggers we do some comparative statics
on the e¤ect of uncertainty. The …rst important result is:
Proposition 2 If ¾ =0the EF and NF operate at the minimum e¢cient
scale, i.e.:
LNF = ^ L = LEF
and the entry strategy is the same, i.e.:
pEF(^ L)=pNF(^ L):
Proof. See Appendix.
If ¾ ! 0; uncertainty disappears, ¯ =+ 1 and
¯¡1
¯ =1 : As volatil-
ity vanishes, entry sizes converge to the minimum e¢cient scale and entry
strategies coincide.28
A second result is:

















the deterministic results conform to those of the uncertainty case.
19Proof. See Appendix.
As the real option theory predicts, we show that increasing risk puts
o¤ investment timing, i.e. the entry price increases with uncertainty. This
follows from the ”bad news principle of irreversible investment”. A larger
market variance makes the investment return more volatile with positive
e¤ect on the option to invest. However, the net marginal bene…t of waiting,
arising from the avoidance of an investment in the bad state, increases with
uncertainty. This induces an entry delay (Bernanke, 1983).
TABLE 3
½ =0 :04 LEF; pEF LNF; pNF
¾ =0 :00¡ >¯= 1 (b L) 1.13; p(b L) 3.40 (b L) 1.13; p(b L) 3.40
¾ =0 :08¡ >¯=4 :05 1.57; 9.84 1.10; 5.36
¾ =0 :20¡ >¯=2 :00 2.99; 39.14 1.07; 7.66
¾ =0 :33¡ >¯=1 :50 7.83; 218.67 1.05; 11.10
Furthermore, as uncertainty increases, the NF gets larger and the EF
smaller, making for a wider gap.
The intuition behind such a result may be better grasped referring to
conditions (16) and (17). As usual, for the EF, the higher entry price makes
the …rm react by increasing the optimal size so as to keep the value marginal
product in pace with the market wage.
For the NF;the full wage imputed to each employee-member goes up with
¾, and the …rm may desire to reduce its size to adjust the value marginal
product. The calibrated comparison is in Table 3.
20Proposition 3 states the impossibility of a global rank in terms of en-
try prices for the two distinct …rms. Nonetheless, for small values of price
volatility the above asymmetry of behavior bene…ts the NF.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
by Proposition 2, we may derive the following:
Corollary 1 In terms of entry strategies, the NF is locally less risky than
the EF.
Proof. See Appendix.
The most striking result springs from local analysis around ¾ =0 : For
low price volatility, the NF is locally less risky than the EF; since the NF0s
set of entry prices is “less convex” than that of the EF. As it can be seen in
Figure 3, the entry boundary increases in di¤erent fashions for the two kinds
of …rms.
Since the employee-members of a NF s h a r ee q u a l l yt h eo p t i o nt oi n v e s t ,
they may demand a higher reward and require a smaller dimension to com-
pensate for the increased risk. This lowers the net marginal bene…t of waiting
of each individual member, reducing the incentive to delay entry.











Proposition 3 maintains that the lower is the volatility of the market price,
the narrower is the gap between price and average total cost required to make
the irreversible investment to enter. The vanishing of uncertainty makes the
size of the two …rms converge to a unique level, one from above (the EF)a n d
the other from below (the NF) since one increases it size with uncertainty,
while the other does the opposite. In the deterministic case, EFs and NFs
perform the same way and share the same optimal entry strategy (Proposition
2).
The employee-members receive a “salary” that is the sum of w plus the
22option to invest, whose value grows with uncertainty and makes entry strate-
gies diverge. In the case of the EF the option is held by shareholders. While,
the option to start-up in the hands of employee-members re‡ects their skill
to set up a …rm. This di¤erence is the one that commands a higher reward
as uncertainty and sunk costs enter the picture. All these considerations are
independent of the market structure in which the SUF is embedded (see
Leahy, 1993).
From the three Propositions the NF appears a more suitable entrepre-
neurial organization in times of high volatility, as the 1997 - 2001 period was.
After all, as shown in Pastor and Veronesi (2004), volatility boosts the value
of a …rm even if there is no bubble.
5 Conclusions
We have gone through entry policies of two kinds of …rms, EFs and NFs;
to partially explain why, during the years between 1997 and 2001, we have
observed a faster growth in the number of NFs vis à vis EFs.
We have seen that the main di¤erences between the two …rms are their
size at entry and their way to react to uncertainty. The NF enters at a
smaller size while the EF at a larger size. Moreover the EF is more risky
around the entry price than the NF. Both statements may explain:
1. why there are so many entries of NFsduring a period of high volatility
such as the years between 97-2001
2. the smaller operation scale of NFs.
Evidence coming from US Census data is de…nitely consistent with the
theoretical observation that NFs are smaller than EFs.
The divergence between the two entry policies is due to the irreversible
23commitment that is associated with entry decision under uncertainty.
Employee-members of the NF hold an option to enter whose value in-
creases with market volatility. The option adds to the market wage making
the total ”salary” paid higher with respect to the EF. Under decreasing
marginal productivity of labor, the NF enters at a smaller scale whenever
there is price volatility. Employee-members of a NF hold an option that
is the signal of a special ability to set up a …rm of their own. The option
value increases with uncertainty and the size of the irreversible commitment,
making the reward for employee-members di¤er from the sheer market wage
even in the long run equilibrium of the …rm. All these considerations are
consistent with the conclusion that the NF is less risky.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let start proving the …rst part of the proposition. To do this let’s us recall



















In general a00(L) < 0 does not imply that b00(L) < 0: the two regions, where
the SOC holds, overlap only partially. Therefore, we con…ne to their overlap-
24ping set. That is, over the range where the SOC holds, since LNF is such
that a0(LNF )=0 ; we have that b0(LNF)=a(LNF) > 0: Then, if there exists
a LEF such that b0(LEF)=0 ; this will necessarily be
LNF <L EF:




By the concavity of Q(L) it is easy to show that limL!0 AC(L)=+ 1 and
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Q(L) > 1 ¡ K
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So there exists a value ^ L>0 such that @AC
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which, in the range where the SOC holds, implies that ^ L<L EF:
25On the contrary, from the comparison between (19) and (9), we notice
that the NF operates only in the descending branch of the curve to the left




































which implies that ^ L>L NF. Then, the second part follows by convexity of
AC(L) around ^ L:
QED
6.2 Proof of proposition 2
If ¾ ! 0 we get ¯ ! +1 and
¯¡1
¯ ! 1: By direct inspections of (16) and
(17) (or equivalently (9) and (15)), we get the …rst part.
6.3 Proof of proposition 3
By applying the implicit function theorem to (15) and (9), it can be shown




¯ decreases and the
opposite e¤ect on optimal dimension follows. Moreover, totally di¤erentiat-






























> 0 for LNF < ^ L (21)
By the above result and (18) it is easy to ascertain the positivity of both. In
particular, if ¾ !1we have that ¯ ! 1 and
¯¡1
¯ ! 0 and no type of …rm
will enter in the market.
QED
6.4 Proof of Corollary 1
T h es l o p eo ft h ee n t r yp r i c ea t¾ =0can be found by evaluating (20) and
















j¾=0 AC(^ L) > 0
Then, both …rms have the same slope of entry price at ¾ =0 : Di¤erenti-






























@¾ j¾=0 > 0 and
@LNF
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